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Case Note
PAST CONSIDERATION OR
UNCONNECTED CONSIDERATION?
Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore
[2012] 2 SLR 713
It is trite law that a valid and enforceable contract must be
supported by consideration. The recent Court of Appeal case
of Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore [2012]
2 SLR 713 is a further addition to the local jurisprudence on
consideration, specifically the issue of past consideration.
This note considers the specific issue of past consideration
and argues that its label should be discarded in favour of a
more realistic one that correctly emphasises its underlying
concerns.
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I. Introduction
1 A valid and enforceable contract must be supported by
consideration, defined as either a benefit conferred by the promisee on
the promisor in return for the promisor's promise, or a detriment
incurred by the promisee in return for the promisor's promise.' The
recent Court of Appeal decision of Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of
India Singapore' ("Rainforest Trading") affords us an opportunity to
consider the subsidiary rule that past consideration is not good
consideration ("the past consideration rule").
The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments
and suggestions. All errors remain the authors' own.
1 This definition has been accepted by the Court of Appeal: see Gay Choon Ing v Loh
Sze Ti Terence Peter [2009] 2 SLR(R) 332 at [67]. On consideration generally, see
Lee Pey Woan, "Consideration" in The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang
Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) ch 4.
2 [2012] 2 SLR 713.
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2 This note suggests that the nomenclature of the past
consideration rule, premised as it is on the chronological order in which
consideration is provided, may be misleading and should be discarded.
Even though the supposed exception in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long'
("Pao On") preserves the emphasis on the chronological order by
carving out an emphasis on the promisor's request, the fact remains that
the courts are often more than willing to find such "request", such that
the exception, if indeed it is one, has become the norm. The proper
emphasis is really whether the consideration was connected to the
promise sought to be enforced. The chronological order in which
consideration was given is an indication of such connection but that is
neither determinative nor the primary concern. This note then briefly
discusses various categories in which the past consideration rule may
apply and how a test based on connection will produce a clearer
analysis.
II. Facts and decision in Rainforest Trading
3 The facts of Rainforest Trading concerned commonplace
commercial arrangements. With the intent of investing in the second
appellant, Teledata Information Limited ("Teledata") entered into a
share subscription agreement with the second appellant and its majority
shareholder, Mr Goel. Pursuant to this agreement, a company (the first
appellant) was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands in order for
Mr Goel to transfer his majority shareholding in the second appellant to
the first appellant in return for a certain shareholding in the latter.
Teledata would then invest in and extend loans to the first appellant,
which would in turn use such moneys to extend loans to the second
appellant. The result was for Teledata to eventually hold 51% of the
shares in the first appellant.
4 Subsequently, Teledata nominated its subsidiary, Baytech Inc
("Baytech"), to subscribe to shares in the first appellant. To fund the
subscription, Baytech entered into a facility agreement with the
respondent bank on 22 February 2007. Crucially, the first appellant
"pledged" 10,200,000 shares in the second appellant (representing 51%
of its share capital) as security to the respondent. On 23 February 2007,
Baytech fully drew down on the facility. The first appellant then
delivered share certificates representing the pledged shares and a signed
bank share transfer form to the respondent on 5 April 2007. On the
same day, the second appellant informed the respondent in writing that
it had noted the respondent's interest in the Register of Members.
3 [1980] AC 614.
4 Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore [2012] 2 SLR 713.
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Finally, on 10 December 2007, the first appellant and Baytech each
registered a charge over the pledged shares in favour of the respondent.
5 As it turned out, Baytech failed to repay moneys due to the
respondent on 29 February 2009. After the declaration of an event of
default by the respondent, the respondent sought to enforce its security
over the pledged shares. The High Court ruled that it could.! The court
held that an equitable mortgage carrying an implied power of sale was
created over the pledged shares in favour of the respondent. This was
done through the deposit of the share certificates and the signed blank
share transfer form with the respondent. Since an event of default had
occurred, the respondent could therefore exercise its power of sale.
6 On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellants argued,
inter alia, that the equitable mortgage over the pledged shares was
invalid because the consideration furnished by the respondent, namely
the entrance into the facility agreement or the subsequent disbursement
of funds was past consideration. It was argued that consideration was
past because both said events took place before the creation of the
equitable mortgage on 5April 2007. Further, the exception against past
consideration in Pao On6 did not apply because the first appellant, who
granted the equitable mortgage, did not request the respondent to enter
into the facility agreement in the first place. Also, the first appellant was
never involved in any discussions regarding the loan facility and had no
dealings with the respondent before 5 April 2007. There was thus no
understanding between the parties that the respondent would be
granted the equitable mortgage when the facility agreement was entered
into and when the funds were fully disbursed.
7 The Court of Appeal rejected this argument on two bases. It
first held that there was a "fundamental - and fatal - flaw"' with this
argument because it was inconsistent for the appellants to argue that the
equitable mortgage granted over the pledged shares was unenforceable
due to past consideration, while simultaneously arguing that the first
appellant had no contact with the respondent. In the court's view, any
argument on past consideration is necessarily premised on a separate
agreement that would otherwise have been a valid contract between,
inter alia, the first appellant and the respondent, thus falsifying the
former's claim of no prior dealings.
8 Second, and more substantively, the Court of Appeal held that
the exception in Pao On8 clearly applied: the court was prepared to find,
5 See State Bank of India Singapore v Rainforest Trading Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 699.
6 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [ 1980] AC 614.
7 Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore [2012] 2 SLR 713 at [29].
8 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614.
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in the context of the commercial dealings between the parties, that there
was a request by the appellants that the respondent enter into the facility
agreement with Baytech and that this would be compensated for by the
grant of an equitable mortgage over the pledged shares. The court found
evidentiary support for its analysis in the appellants' letters to the
respondent on 5 April 2007. Those letters showed that the appellants
knew that the share certificates were deposited in accordance with the
facility agreement.
III. Re-examining the past consideration rule
A. Past consideration in Rainforest Trading
9 The past consideration rule was clearly the focus of Rainforest
Trading Apart from being determinative of one aspect of the parties'
appeal, the court also explained that the past consideration rule is a
"firmly established part of both the English and Singapore law of
contract""1 Where it operates, the rule has the effect of preventing an
otherwise valid contract from being formed.11 However, as the court
noted,12 the potential harshness of the rule is mitigated by an apparent
"exception" that has its genesis in the old English case of Lampleigh v
Braithwait13 and stated in its modern form in Pao On. 14 According to
Lord Scarman in Pao On, three cumulative elements must be satisfied
before the "exception" against the past consideration rule can operate
where an act is done before the giving of the promise sought to be
enforced: 15
(a) the act must have been done at the promisor's request;
(b) the parties must have understood that the act was to be
remunerated; and
(c) such remuneration must have been legally enforceable
if it had been promised in advance.
9 See Lee Pey Woan, "Consideration" in The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew
Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) at paras 04.016-04.017.
10 Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore [2012] 2 SLR 713 at [34].
11 Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore [2012] 2 SLR 713 at [35].
12 Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore [2012] 2 SLR 713 at [36].
13 (1615) Hob 105.
14 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614.
15 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614 at 629. See also Re Casey's Patents [1892]
1 Ch 104 and the Malaysian cases of GBH Ceramics Sdn Bhd v How It @ Low Aik
[1989] 2 CLJ 427 and South East Asia Insurance Bhd v Nasir Ibrahim [ 1992] 2 MLJ 355.
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The court, with respect, correctly pointed out that this is not a true
exception inasmuch as it operates outside of the past consideration
rule. 1
10 The court in Rainforest Trading17 also pointed out that "while
the doctrine of past consideration remains part of our law, it would
generally be difficult for a party to successfully argue that a perfectly
sensible and legitimate commercial transaction is unenforceable simply
because the consideration provided for the promise was past".18 The
court seemed to justify this by reference to the modern approach in
contract law that requires "very little" to find the existence of
consideration. It also pointed out that a strictly chronological approach
in determining whether consideration is past or not is "deeply
unrealistic and unnecessarily restrictive" and it undermines the freedom
of contracting parties and the sanctity of commercial transactions.19
These are, once again, very sensible views well supported by authority.2"
B. Past consideration or unconnected consideration?
11 The court's analysis in Rainforest Trading' follows the traditional
analysis in resolving such questions: the chronological order in which
the consideration is given relative to the promise sought to be enforced
is first examined and a determination is made whether the consideration
was factually past. If factually past, the subsequent question is whether
the consideration was nonetheless given at the request of the promisor
and if so, the "exception" in Pao On" applies. This traditional analysis
seemingly attributes too great an importance to the chronology of
events," an approach that is perhaps inherently mandated by the
label "past consideration". However, factual past consideration is not
equivalent to legal past consideration; it is the latter which renders
the promise unenforceable. Factual past consideration is merely an
indication of the possibility of such an outcome.
16 See also Lee Pey Woan, "Consideration" in The Law of Contract in Singapore
(Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) at para 04.017.
17 Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore [2012] 2 SLR 713.
18 Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore [2012] 2 SLR 713 at [38].
19 Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore [2012] 2 SLR 713 at [38].
20 See, for example, in the Singapore context, Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com
Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR(R) 594 at [139] and Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng
Khim MingEric [2007] 1 SLR(R) 853 at [29]-[30].
21 Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore [2012] 2 SLR 713.
22 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614.
23 To be fair, this approach does not regard chronology as conclusive: see Lee Pey
Woan, "Consideration" in The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon
Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) at para 04.013.
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12 However, legal past consideration is itself a conclusion; not a
test. What is critical is to articulate the substantive test behind this
conclusion. It is proposed that the true substantive test is whether the
consideration is intrinsically and causally connected with the promise
sought to be enforced."4 The necessary connection in this regard is that
the consideration is given in exchange for the promise. In other words,
the courts are looking for a "bargained for" consideration. On this basis,
and to avoid further misguidance by a misleading label, it may be
preferable to re-label the doctrine of "past consideration" as "connected
consideration". It thus also follows that the apparent "exception" in Pao
On2 should instead be regarded as the general rule, that is, whether
the consideration was "connected" to the promise. Indications of such
connectivity, none of which are conclusive by themselves, would include
whether the consideration was given at the request of the promisor or
whether the consideration was given after the promise. The key question
is always whether the consideration was connected, rather than whether
it was factually past.
13 Such an approach finds support in Dent v Bennett,26 an oft-cited
case for the past consideration rule.2 In that case, the defendant surgeon
alleged that a deceased patient had agreed to pay him £25,000 for,
inter alia, "the gratitude and respect of the [deceased] to the defendant
for past services" 8 Such past services included, most importantly, saving
the deceased's life on one occasion in 1827. The plaintiff, who was
the executor of the deceased's will, applied to set aside that supposed
agreement. Cottenham LC granted the application. Although he had
characterised the defendant's case as being built on a "gratuitous reward
for past services"," his judgment did not focus on the chronology in
which consideration was given for the promise sought to be enforced.
Instead, he focused on whether the objective evidence showed the
deceased ever agreed to pay the defendant £25,000 for such services. He
held that the evidence did not show such an intention. On the contrary,
the deceased had shown little gratitude to the defendant: in 1828, the
deceased told the defendant to stop providing his medical services if the
latter intended to charge for them. These facts showed "a state of the
testator's mind and feelings towards the [d]efendant wholly inconsistent
24 Although some leading texts (see, for example, Chitty on the Law of Contract
(H G Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 30th Ed, 2008) at p 271) say that in
determining whether consideration is past, the courts are not bound to apply a
strictly chronological test, such statements do not help in clarifying when and why
the courts are not so bound, which is the true underlying test.
25 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [ 1980] AC 614.
26 (1839) 41 ER 105.
27 See, for example, Chitty on the Law of Contract (H G Beale gen ed) (Sweet &
Maxwell, 30th Ed, 2008) at p 270.
28 Dent vBennett (1839) 41 ER 105 at 107.
29 Dent vBennett (1839) 41 ER 105 at 107.
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with that exuberance of gratitude and generosity which could alone
have rendered the alleged agreement intelligible"*° The learned
Lord Chancellor therefore concluded that the deceased never approved
of the alleged agreement.
14 The reasoning used in Dent v Bennett1 therefore does not adopt
a strictly chronological approach. Instead, by examining the evidence
related to the deceased's intention after he had found that the
consideration given was factually past, the Lord Chancellor recognised
the possibility that factually past consideration could, in appropriate
cases, be good consideration. The determinative criterion in that case
was whether the deceased had intended to compensate the defendant
from the very start. In other words, whether the consideration was
connected with the promise sought to be enforced. Such a connection is
probably easier to establish if the consideration was provided after the
promise was made, but that is by no means wholly determinative of
the matter. What truly matters is whether the promisor intended the
consideration to be in exchange for the promise given.
15 Eastwood v Kenyon," another leading case on the past
consideration rule, likewise supports this analysis. In that case, the
plaintiff had provided for a young woman. When the young woman
later got married, the husband promised the plaintiff that he would
repay the money spent on her support. As it turned out, the husband
failed to pay and the plaintiff sued the husband for the money promised.
This claim was dismissed since it was not supported by consideration.
Lord Denman CJ regarded as correct in general the principle of law
stated in a note to the case of Wennall v Adney: "an express promise can
only revive a precedent good consideration, which might have been
enforced at law through the medium of an implied promise, had it not
been suspended by some positive rule of law" 4 Such a promise will be
implied for, as an example, necessaries given to an infant or where there
was in fact an actual request by the promisor." Once again, it is the
existence of such implied promises that connects the consideration to
the promise sought to be enforced. While Lord Denman CJ said that
consideration given in Eastwood v Kenyon was factually past, 6 that was
not determinative of his conclusion that it was not good consideration.
It was rather because that consideration was not "at the request of the
[husband], nor even of his wife ... the declaration really discloses nothing
but a benefit voluntarily conferred by the plaintiff and received by the
30 Dent vBennett (1839) 41 ER 105 at 108.
31 (1839) 41ER 105.
32 (1840) 113 ER482.
33 3B&P249.
34 EastwoodvKenyon (1840) 113 ER 482 at 485.
35 EastwoodvKenyon (1840) 113 ER 482 at 485.
36 EastwoodvKenyon (1840) 113 ER 482 at 487.
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",37[husband], with an express promise by the [husband] to pay money.
The absence of any request, and therefore the lack of a necessary
connection between the consideration and the promise, was the
determinative reason in that case.
16 This analysis is also consistent with Professor Carter's analysis in
his joint textbook on Australian contract law. 8 He draws a distinction
between executed and past consideration: in the case of executed
consideration, "the act of forbearance supplied is part of the same
transaction as the promise sought to be enforced", whereas in the case
of past consideration, "the promise is made after an independently
constituted and concluded transaction" [emphasis added] .3' This likewise
recognises the true reason why so-called past consideration is not good
consideration: when consideration is given in the past, it is indicative
that it arose in a different and independent transaction. Where however
there is a connection between the consideration and promise, such that
the promise is made in the same transaction as the consideration, the
promise will be enforceable.
C. Why analysis based on "connected consideration" is preferable
(1) Analysis based on "connected consideration" better accords with
rationale behind past consideration rule
17 From the perspectives of terminology and jurisprudential
basis, an analysis based on "connected consideration" is preferable to
one based on "past consideration". Other than the reasons that have
been highlighted above, such an analysis better reflects the rationale
underpinning the past consideration rule. In Eastwood v Kenyon,"
Lord Denman C explained why transactions affected by past
consideration are not enforced by the courts:
4
The enforcement of such promises by law, however plausibly reconciled
by the desire to effect all conscientious engagements, might be
attended with mischievous consequences to society; one of which
would be the frequent preference of voluntary undertakings to claims
for just debts. Suits would thereby be multiplied, and voluntary
undertakings would also be multiplied, to the prejudice of real
creditors.
37 EastwoodvKenyon (1840) 113 ER 482 at 487.
38 J W Carter, Elisabeth Peden & G J Tolhurst, Contract Law in Australia (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 5th Ed, 2007) at p 122. See also Lee Pey Woan, "Consideration" in
The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy
Publishing, 2012) at para 04.012.
39 J W Carter, Elisabeth Peden & G J Tolhurst, Contract Law in Australia (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 5th Ed, 2007) at p 122.
40 (1840) 113 ER 482.
41 EastwoodvKenyon (1840) 113 ER 482 at 487.
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18 The passage cited above demonstrates two competing concerns
at the heart of the past consideration rule.42 On the one hand, there is a
need to restrict the types of promises enforceable by the law. On the
other hand, there is a need to also recognise claims by "real" creditors,
that is, claims that have been intended by both parties to be binding.
Whether consideration is factually past cannot provide a normative
reason why certain promises are enforced or not. It is instead a
manifestation of a more primary reason: promises are not enforced if
the alleged consideration is not intrinsically and causally connected to
it; the consideration is simply not given for the promise concerned.
This preserves the central idea of reciprocity behind the doctrine of
consideration. On the contrary, to say that consideration is not good
simply because it was given in the past is potentially under-inclusive for
this does not account for instances where the parties had intended for
consideration to be for a future promise. While this may be taken
into account by the Pao On "exception", it is submitted that that is
nonetheless insufficient for it does not accord primary importance to
the true underlying basis for enforcement (or non-enforcement) of
promises affected by what is presently known as "past consideration".
(2) Analysis based on "connected consideration" is context sensitive
and avoids artificial reasoning
19 This analysis based on "connected consideration" also avoids
the fiction that the courts may resort to when confronted with a fact
situation involving past consideration. A prominent example is in the
area of guarantees. A contract of guarantee will fail for being given for
past consideration, like any other contract.43 This presents a particular
problem in guarantees because the statement of consideration may itself
give the appearance of being past consideration: for example, the
guarantee may be given "in consideration of an account having been
opened".44 In such cases, older authorities have held that the consideration
is past and that there is no contract.4 5 Modern authorities have tried to
overcome these older authorities by avoiding a "literal interpretation of
the expressed statement of consideration in the guarantee where it
42 Eastwood v Kenyon (1840) 113 ER 482 was decided at a time when the tide was
turning against the view that consideration included certain pre-existing "moral"
obligations. The case is illustrative of that trend. This should be taken into account
when considering the case: see Chitty on the Law of Contract (H G Beale gen ed)
(Sweet & Maxwell, 30th Ed, 2008) at pp 273-274. See also Steve Thel & Edward
Yorio, "The Promissory Basis of Past Consideration" (1992) 78 Va L Rev 1045.
43 James O'Donovan & John Phillips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2nd Ed, 2010) at p 72.
44 James O'Donovan & John Phillips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2nd Ed, 2010) at p 82.
45 See, for example, Oldershaw v King (1857) 157 ER 213.
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might appear on the face of it to be past consideration* 46 Thus, in
SH Lock Discounts & Credits Pty Ltd v Miles,47 although the creditor's
consideration was expressed as "at my request agreed to make loans to
C) the past tense used was interpreted to mean the making of future
loans. This therefore avoided the issue of past consideration.
20 However, this interpretative technique may be criticised for
being overly imaginative, straining the ordinary understanding of English
language. 48 This is no doubt the unfortunate product of the traditional
analysis of past consideration that puts the chronology of events as a
determinative criterion, subject to an exception. Such artificial reasoning
may, however, be avoided if we focus on the singular most important
question of whether the consideration given was for the guarantee in
question. This suggested analysis is straightforward and sensitive to the
commercial context, in this case, the nature of security transactions.
Securities are typically furnished post the occurrence of events which
amount to consideration for the provision of the relevant security.
D. Categories in which "connected consideration" can be applied
and relevant factors
21 In this section, the analysis suggested will be applied to three
distinct categories in which past consideration may arise. In considering
these categories, ways will also be suggested in which the promisor can
be made liable even outside the regime of contract law.
(1) Services rendered in the past to the benefit ofpromisor
22 Where services were rendered in the past to the benefit of the
promisor, whether the promisor may remain liable will depend on
whether the consideration is connected to the promise of payment in
the sense that it was given in exchange for the payment. Based on this
test, therefore, in a case of rescue and subsequent promise of reward, the
reward is unenforceable because the consideration was given without
the contemplation of the possibility of a reward and hence, ineffective.
On the other hand, if the consideration is given in contemplation of the
reward and hence connected with the promise, the promisor shall be
liable for payment. One explanation is that the original request and
response constitute an agreement to pay a reasonable amount for the
service rendered, and that the actual agreeing on a specific sum is a
settlement of the original right to a claim of a reasonable sum. The
46 James O'Donovan & John Phillips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2nd Ed, 2010) at p 83.
47 [1963]VR656.
48 J Phillips, "Guarantees: Protecting the Bankers" [2012] JBL 248 at 255.
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consideration is found in the settlement of the earlier entitlement in
favour of the specific sum."
23 This is well-illustrated by the High Court decision of Foo Song
Mee v Ho Kiau Seng ° and the subsequent Court of Appeal decision of
Foo Song Mee v Ho Kiau Seng1 ("Foo Song Mee (CA)"). In Foo Song Mee v
Ho Kiau Seng,i2 the plaintiff, a real estate agent, claimed the balance of a
sum from the defendant pursuant to an alleged contract. Under that
contract, the defendant had allegedly agreed to pay the plaintiff a
commission in consideration of the plaintiff procuring "a good price" in
relation to the defendant's en bloc purchase of some apartments. The
High Court found that the quantum of the commission was not agreed
before the options to purchase the apartments were granted. There was
instead only a promise to pay an unspecified sum before the defendant
secured the options. The final sum was agreed (if at all) only in a
subsequent agreement after the options had been granted. Therefore,
according to the court, the plaintiff's effort in securing a good price was
past consideration in relation to the subsequent agreement.
24 The judgment of the High Court was overturned by the Court
of Appeal in Foo Song Mee (CA)." The appellate court's decision
emphasised the importance of looking at the substance of the transaction;
it disagreed with the High Court's finding that consideration was past.
The error, according to the Court of Appeal, was in viewing the
subsequent agreement on the quantum of commission in isolation,
rather than in its proper context. It is not uncommon for commercial
parties to postpone the agreement of the specific sum or other details to
a later date, especially if the counter-performance is considered urgent
and is requested to be performed expeditiously. Moreover, even without
the subsequent agreement on a specific sum to be paid, as long as there
is an agreement that there shall be remuneration, it amounts to
sufficient consideration to support a claim in contractual quantum
meruit.54 The court would in such circumstances imply a term of
reasonable remuneration. It is difficult to see how the presence of a
subsequent agreement on a specific sum would then turn a contractual
claim into a non-contractual claim. An overly technical approach may
thus defeat parties' expectation to be bound by a contract and out of
step with commercial practices. This illustrates the danger of looking at
49 J W Carter, Elisabeth Peden & G J Tolhurst, Contract Law in Australia (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 5th Ed, 2007) at p 123.
50 [2011] SGHC 4.
51 [2011] SGCA45.
52 [2011] SGHC'4.
53 Foo Song Mee v Ho Kiau Seng [2011 ] SGCA 45.
54 Rabiah Bee bte Mohamed Ibrahim v Salem Ibrahim [2007] 2 SLR(R) 655 at [123].
See also Judith Prakash J's discussion (at [122]-[124]) on the distinction between
contractual quantum meruit and restitutionary quantum meruit.
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chronology as a determinative criterion in ascertaining the sufficiency of
consideration. This error would have been avoided if the governing
criterion were regarded to be that of connection, rather than chronology.
(2) Promise given in the past for the benefit of promisor
25 Where the consideration consists of a promise rather than a
service (that is, a past act), the principles in the previous category can
also apply," but in such cases, the Pao On "exception", which requires
an antecedent request from the promisor for the promisee's counter-
promise, is likely to be important. Unlike cases in the previous category,
consideration in the present context is not as easily found in a material
benefit given in exchange for the promise. Rather, it is the element of
"request" (which is also relevant, but perhaps to a different extent, in the
past services context) that provides the necessary connection between
the consideration and the promise. The danger of adopting a purely
chronological approach as the primary recourse is that it misses the true
underlying premise behind the enforcement (or non-enforcement) of
promises in such cases.
(3) Services rendered in the past but not to the benefit ofpromisor
26 Where services were rendered in the past but not to the benefit
of the promisor, it is very likely that the promisor will not be liable.
Eastwood v Kenyon56 is arguably a case within this category. Although a
broad argument can be made that support for the young woman was to
the husband's eventual benefit, the fact remains that when the service
was rendered, the husband was never in the promisee's (or wife's)
contemplation. Therefore, there was no benefit to the promisor at the
time the promise was made. This is a strong indication of the lack of any
connection between consideration and service. In all the categories
discussed thus, we see that the primary criterion is that of connection,
rather than chronology, even if the latter provides an indication as to the
legal effectiveness of the alleged consideration.
IV. Conclusion
27 In conclusion, this note, through a discussion of Rainforest
Trading," has suggested that the past consideration rule should not be
envisaged as one based primarily on chronology. That approach is liable
to result in artificial reasoning used to get around a criterion that does
55 Chitty on the Law of Contract (H G Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 30th Ed, 2008)
at p 272.
56 (1840) 113 ER 482.
57 Rainforest Trading Ltd v State Bank of India Singapore [2012] 2 SLR 713.
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not even constitute the substantive basis of the past consideration rule.
It is preferable to simply ask whether the consideration is "connected" to
the promise sought to be enforced, and this may done through the
various categories suggested above. More broadly, the Court of Appeal's
statement that past consideration is easily found may also indicate that
the doctrine of consideration in Singapore is easily satisfied. To some
extent, this may possibly herald, as some have argued,58 the demise of
consideration in Singapore.
58 See Koo Zhi Xuan, "Envisioning the Judicial Abolition of the Doctrine of
Consideration in Singapore" (2011) 23 SAcLJ 463 for an extensive examination of
the possible rationales of consideration. The learned author argues for the abolition
of consideration after concluding that that its supposed rationales are not convincing.
